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I. 
Introduction. 
Prom 1806 to 1812 international trade re-
lationships were dominated and determined, in a large 
measure, by the policies followed in England, in France, 
and in the United States of America. In Prance, Napolean 
had launched his 11 grand scheme for excommunicating Great 
Britain from the society of nations", his Continental 
Syatem. England had replied with measures establishing 
a Continental Blockade. And the United States had voiced 
her protest against the adoption of these policies and, 
at the same time, had given some indication of her 
ambitions by the adoption of a Restrictive System. It 
was a period in which great commercial issues were at 
stake. For England and for France, it was a nlife and 
death struggle" from which England emerged the fittest. 
For the United States, it was a period preparatory to 
that of the War of 1812 by which she completed the 
achievement of her independence from England and 
established her rights and position as a maritime power. 
A study of the commercial poi'&cy, either of England, of 
France or of the United States, would be a reasonable 
task for the pretensions of any paper. But these policies 
are so interdependent and so closely related that it is 
a difficult matter to attempt this separate treatment. 
Perhaps, however, if we can detach a portion of the 
2. 
subject-matter from the whole and can succeed in giving 
it a clear and a fair portrayal, our efforts will not 
have been in vain. It is this more or less fragmentary 
treatment which our paper attempts while, at the same 
time, trying to be true to the implications and the 
relations of the remaining parts of the subject. 
Before beginning our task, it may be well 
to roughly outline the matter with which a full statement of 
the commercial relations of this period would be concerned. 
We tabulate, for that reason, the principal measures 
relating to trade regulations as they existed between 
1806 and 1812. We may gain from this a sense of the 
importance of the complicated relations of the period. 
1806 - May 16th. The "Brest to Elbe11 blockade. 
NoV.21st. The Berlin Decree. 
1807 - Jan. 7th. British Order in Council 
prohibiting coasting trade. 
Nov.11th. British Orders in Council^ 
Dec. 17th. The Milan Decree."' 
Dec.22nd. The American Embargo Act.' 
1809 - Mar. 1st. Embargo removed and Non-inter-
course substituted/ 
Apr.19th. Erstoine's arrangement. 
Apri26th. British Order in Council 
modifying the blockade. 
ftug. 9th. Proclamation renewing Non-
intercourse with Great Britain. 
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1810 May 1st. Act of Congress governing trdde 
relations with Great Britain. 
Nov. 2nd. President's proclamation declar-
ing French Decrees rescinded. 
1811 Mar. 2nd. Supplementary Non-intercourseAst. 
1812 Apr. 4th. American Embargo. 
Junel8th. Declaration of war by the TDnited 
States against Groat Britain. 
This paper concerns itself primarily with 
the British side of the question. It is an inquiry into 
British policy in the issuance of the rrders in Council 
for the regulation of trade during the year3 1807 tp 1809. 
It regards these measures as essentially commercial in 
character and endeavors to show the reasons for that 
attitude. This involves a four-fold plan of consideration; 
first, a review of the commercial situation as it existed 
previous to 1807; second, a statement of the development 
of the Orders in Council System in 1807 and of what that 
System consisted in its final form; third, a study of the 
Parliamentary Debates to set forth the evidence concerning 
commercial motives for the Orders as it is to be found, 
(a) in the session of 1808, (b) in the session of 1809; 
fourth, a consideration of the results of the System as 
shown by statistics on British trade relations in 1808. 
This will include also a statement fef the methods used in 
the license practice and the interpretation which that practice 
gives to the Orders in Council System. It is believed that 
the evidence here adduced will be sufficient to indicate 
that the Orders in Council System does not 
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represent a clear-cut and definitely understood policy 
as is so frequently supposed; that the Orders of 
November 11th were dictated by motives which aimed at 
the establishment of a commercial monopoly rather than 
at retaliation upon Prance j that the Orders in Council 
System did not acheive the results which were expected 
of it and that the system could not be, and was not, 
rigorously enforced. 
II. 
The eommercial System previous to 1807. 
The review of the commercial system 
previous to 1807 will involve tracing the growth of 
the United States as a maritime power and will set 
forth her relations with the Continent and with Eng-
land; and, primarily, the purpose will be to in-
dicate the attitude of British statesmen and merchants 
towards the growth of a commercial rival, such as the 
United States, and their concern for the maintenance 
of British maritime superiority. 
The United States came as a bold protest 
against the English colonial policy and the commercial 
o 
system. It was an unique experiment in the development 
of statehood and of nationality. English statesmen, 
monarchically prejudiced, had little faith in the 
success of the task which the infant nation had 
undertaken. The United States had succeeded thus far Itx 
5. 
making good her protest and England soon began to feel 
the effects of the break in her system. These came from 
the West Indian possessions. These islands, in the course 
of their development, had become dependent upon the 
colonies on the coast of America for lumber, live-stock 
and provisions. The changed relations of these colonies 
with the mother-country could not be expected to re-
volutionize, at the same time, their relations with 
the sister colonies in the West Indies. And it did not. 
England was now forced, practically as a condition of 
the existence of the West Indian planter, to grant 
further relaxations of her navigation laws to permit 
the continuance of an intercourse between the West 
Indies and America. It was not an easy matter for 
England to do this since the navigation laws had long 
been considered, both within Parliament and without, as 
the pillar of British maritime superiority. Parliamentary 
debates abounded in rhetorical acoortiouu and eulogies 
on the navigation laws as the source of British power 
and glory. It was asserted that the United States could 
have no just cause for complaint if Great Britain 
should rigidly enforce her navigation laws, for it was 
the prerogative of every mother-country to maintain a 
monopoly of the trade with lier colonies. It was believed 
thet the great advantage of possessing colonies was an 
exclusive trade with them as the due return for having 
given them birth and, subsequently, support. Practical 
6 
considerations, however, made it necessary for Great 
Britain to abandon her theory of rigid adherence to 
the colonial system and to acknowledge that American 
produce was a necessity to the planter in the West 
Indies. 
The act of Parliament which first per-
mitted this intercourse with the United States sought 
to confine it to British ships manned by British sea-
men. But British shipping was found to be inadequate 
to colonial needs. The West Indian governors had met 
the situation by the issuance of proclamations which 
opened their ports to the American shippers^ Parliament 
had protootod and sanctioned this practice by granting 
Bills of Indemnity. 
The renewal of hostilities between Eng-
land and France in 1793 necessarily opened the French 
West Indian porta to the United States. France could 
not cope with British naval superiority. The admission 
of the United States to these ports aroused the jealousy 
of Great Britain. The "Rule of 1756", so-called because 
of it's promulgation in that year, was now more rigorous-
ly enforced. It declared to be illegal all trade with 
the colonies of an enemy in time of war because such 
a trade was not permitted in time of peace. American 
practice had found a means of evading the rigors of this 
rule and Great Britain had, for a long time, given assent 
to it. This evasion was accomplished by a practice known 
7. 
as the breaking of the continuity of a voyage. This 
meant the continuance of a trade for Prance with her 
colonies by means of an indirect intercourse thru the 
United States. The American trader proceded in this 
manner: sailing from a French West Indian port to an 
American port, he would land there, pay duties and thence 
re-export to France. The entrance at the American port 
was held to break the continuity of the voyage and thus 
legalize it. America profited greatly by this practice, 
much to the surprise of Great Britain who had thot that 
the expense to be incurred by such a procedure would 
offer an effectual discouragement 46 the trader. The 
carrying trade thus conducted was proving profitable 
business; the United States was becoming a great carrier 
of trade and a rival whom Great Britain regarded jealous-
ly. British interests were being injured to a considerable 
extent. The number of British ships entering inwardly 
and clearing outwardly from ports of the United States 
had greatly diminished^e#*ea?. 1790. Some 55© ships with 
a capacity of 115000 tons had cleared inwardly and out-
wardly from United States ports in 1790; the returns 
from the custom-house showed about 100 entries in 1799 
and about 140 in 1800. The returns for three years, 
1790-1792, showed an average of some 260 entries of 
American ships with a capacity of 54000 tons; the total 
for the entries in 1800 were 1057 ships with a capacity 
8. 
ft. 
of 236000 tons. The export trade of the United States, 
no distinction "being made between domestic and foreign 
exports prior to 1803, showed an increase of 143.94$ 
between the years 1790 and 1801. 
A decision in the "Polly^base^, rendered 
Pebrurary 5th, 1800, held that the landing of a cargo 
and the payment of a duty in a port of the United States 
broke the continuity of the voyage and legalized the 
trade carried by a neutral between the mother-country 
and a colony. Sir Wm. Scott, v/ho gave this opinion, re-
versed it a few years later in the case of the "Essex". 
This decision, rendered in July, 1805, was among the 
"signs of the times" and was for the purpose of getting** 
at American practice in this carrying trade which had 
assumed such alarming proportions. It held that "mere 
touching at any port without importing the cargo into 
the common stock of the country will not alter the 
nature of the voyage"; that the existence of an 
"original intention" to send the vessel on was sufficient 
to make the voyage continuous and that "a continuous 
voyage from the colony of the enemy to the mother-
country or to any parts but those to which the vessel 
belongs will subject the cargo to confiscation". Scores 
of American vessels were seized on the basis of this 
decision. It fs effect was to condemn a large portion 
of the American traffic with Europe. ( See below for 
statistics estimating the amount of this carrying trade 
with Europe.) 
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Closely following the "Essex" decision 
came that famous pamphlet by James Stephen. n War in 
Disguise or the Frauds of Neutral Flags11 was published 
in October 1805. It was a powerful and very effective 
pamphlet in it fs influence upon British judicial and 
popular opinion. It confirmed the British IrfrrH^nny of 
jealousy and hostility towards the rapidly growing ^ 
i c 
maritime power of America. Stephen was a thorofgoing 
commercialist and it is this spirit of commercialism 
which actuates and dominates the entire pamphlet. Bitter 
towards the American carrier whose activities he deemed 
11 fraudulent11. deeply concerned for what he took to be 
the undermining of British maritime superiori'tyy he 
sought to create a favorable sentiment for measures which 
would strike vital blows at the growing prosperity of the 
American aarrying trade and which would react favorably 
to British interests at the same time. "War in Disguise11 
was thoroly given over to this iden. It is interesting to 
note in this pamphlet the argument and it^s^proposed 
remedy for the situation. James Stejtfien was intimately 
associated with the origination of the Orders in Council 
System. He was among those v/ho fathered the measure. This 
fact should make the presentation of his views relating 
to commerce of a neutral a commentary of no mean im-
portance upon the policy which dictated the Orders in 
Councfl. It is with this idea in mind that we now give 
10. 
c 
our attention to "War in Disguise" and note it's 
distinctly hostile attitude towards American commerce 
and it's emphasis upon the necessity for the mainten-
ance of British maritime superiority. The sentiments 
expressed in this pamphlet can easily be motives for 
the action taken by ministers in November 1811. 
"War in Disguise" had for it 1^ basic 
principle the idea that the continued superiority 
of Great Britain at sea was essential as providing an 
effective obstacle to the ambition of France to become 
an universal empire. It regarded British maritime 
superiority as never more decisive than in the present 
period yet could not see that it was seriously in-
conveniencing the enemy or working hardships upon him. 
It saw his commercial and colonial interests rhined in 
appearance only, not in reality. France had neutral 
carriers for her colonial produce and of these carriers 
the United States was the worst offender as it was by 
the frauds of her flag that the just deserts to British 
supremacy upon the sea had disappeared. This colonial 
trade existed only because Great Britain had not exercis 
ed her full belligerent rights. The results of this 
relaxation in belligerent rights were; that colonial 
produce is poured into the continental markets to rival 
and to undersell that of the British merchants and 
planters in those markets; that the enemy has derived 
full benefit from his colonies without the sxpense of 
11 
protecting them; that the neutral frauds have depressed 
the maritime power of Great Britain and exalted that of 
Prancej that France is enabled to use all her naval 
power in offensive operations and has it concentrated near 
the seat of her empire while the British navy must re-
main widely scattered from the necessity of protecting 
her commercial interests; that the paramount evil of 
the independence and the growing commerce of the United 
States is in it fs seduction of British seamen, a means 
by which the neuttral carrier is nourished with the life-
blood of the British navy; that this growing neutral 
commerce was a great discouragement to the commerce of 
Great Britain and that Ttihe relaxation of belligerent 
rights had thrown the world's carrying trade into the 
hands of the Americans who threatened the maritime 
superiority of Great Britain and were further offenders 
in so much as they were frustrating British hostilities 
against the commerce and the revenue of France. The 
situation was one which called for effectual remedial 
measures by Great Britain. It was within her prerogative 
to apply this remedy for it was only by the gratuitous 
concession of belligerent rights that neutrals were 
enabled to carry the colonial trade of British enemies. 
These concessions could be withdrawn after a reasonable 
notice and the penalty for the violation of belligerent 
rights made the seizure and the confiscation of the 
ship and the cargo. Such a procedure would speedily prove 
12. 
an effective remedy. The enemies would soon give up the 
use of neutral bottoms in their colonial trade, finding 
that ho protection was afforded by them; they would 
hoist again their own commercial flags and there would 
be restored to Great Britain the just fruits of her 
naval superiority. 11 Our seamen would be enriched , our 
imports would be very largely increased and every western 
breeze wtould waft into the channel, not a neutral sail 
or two to furnish diplomatic squabbles and litigation in 
the admiralty but mumerous and valuable prizes and 
sometimes entire fleets of mercahantmen with their con-
voys taken from enemies and under hostile colors11. This 
remedy would restore to the belligerent superior at 3ea 
those natural advantages which he ought justly to enjoy. 
"He (Napolean) calls us the 'tyrants of the seaf but if 
the throne is ours he has filched away the scepter and 
our naval diadem, like his own iron crown of Lombardy, 
/ f 
is, in a commercial view, cumbersome and worthless11 • 
Stephen's protest agaitfst the growth of 
the commerce of the United States voiced the British 
attitude towards the commercial independence of the new 
republic. Great Britain was finding this maritime 
carrier of the New World a rival of no mean size,and 
some means must be found to enable Great Britain to 
maintain her monopoly. This was the issue which over-
shadowed all others in British councils. 
There was some justification for this 
References for page 12 
Stephen, James - n War in Disguise or the Frauds 
of Neutral Flags"• 
13. 
attitude of Great Britain in the growth of American 
maritime activity. America had great length of coast 
line and an abundance of harbors. Conditions were 
favorable for her inhabitants, Hew Englanders especially, 
to become a sea-faring peojble. Intercolonial cummunication 
had been largely by sea. Geographical conditions had 
rlefcermined this. The coastwise trade had been a large 
factor in bringing: about a common bond between the 
Americans. The achievement of independence masked the 
beginning of a period of pronounced maritime expansion 
for the United Dtates tho she remained essentially an 
agricultural community for many years. She possessed an 
abundance of products from agriculture, from the fisher-
ies and from the forests. She drew her supply of 
manufactured articles fJrom England and from Europe, 
principally from England, and gave her raw material in 
exchange.'The total values of her exports, being the 
products of agriculture, of forests, of sea and of 
manufactures, for the years 1803-1810 will make clearer 
this point. It will indicate also the extent to which 
the United States was using her resources in raw 
materials^ 
Not the least of Americafs advantages was 
her central position in relation to the West Indian and 
the European markets. Intercourse with these markets 
was very remunerative and was rapidly assuming regular-
ity. English thot had not at first appreciated these 
advantages which America possessed or, if so, had 
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1803 $ 1355000 
1804 2100000 
1805 2300000 
1806 2707000 
1807 2120000 
1808 344000 
1809 1506000 
1810 1917000. 
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remained largely indifferent to them. Englishmen re-
peatedly assured themselves that America could not 
become a maritime power or a manufacturing country. 
The Americans themselves did not realize their resources. 
They were strongly prejudiced against manufactures until 
experience showed that many articles could be made as 
cheaply as they cibuld be imported from Europe and there 
would still be left to the manufacturer and the capital-
ist ample returns for his labor and the risk involved. 
American vessels were becoming more and 
more the favorite carriers on the ovean. They were fast, 
safe, took better care of goods, loaded and unloaded 
most quickly, enjoyed comparatively low rates of in-
surance and were thus enabled to handle valuable cargoes 
at a fair margin of profit.^ The Yankee was proving him-
self a 3hrewd competitor^ £fcr the British merchant. 
European conditions, too, favored the development of 
the United States as a maritime Jaewer and her immense 
carrying trade on the eve of the institution of the 
fflrders in Council System. The extent of this carrying * 
trade may be gathered from the accounts of the exports 
from the United States to European ports between the 
years 1803 and 1810. The foreign eexports will indicate 
the carrying trade. 
American commerce was gradually assuming 
a continental character. Her vessels would ship for 
European ports where payment for the cargoes was 
received principally in bills of exchange on London. 
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Total values of exports from U.S. to European countries 
for years ending Sept. 30th 1803 - 1810. 
To Prance. 
Domestic* Foreign 
1803 $1877040 2598674 
1804 3220112 5604942 
1805 3079862 9885602 
1806 3226698 8197694 
1807 27169L41 10315678 
1808 708680 2126396 
1809 $£xxxxx XXXXXXX 
1810 16782 1670. 
To the United Kingdom. 
Domestic. Foreign. 
1803 $16459264 1342090 
1804 11787659 1418842 
1805 13939663 1472600 
1806 12737913 2855583 
1807 21122332 2027650 
1808 3093978 106327 
1809 5326194 239405 
1810 111588438 892435. 
To Europe generally "for a market" 
Domestic. Foreign 
1803 $ 178699 156754 
1804 86827 534064 
1805 189608 628608 
1806 85695 212385 1807 31505 41191 
1808 xxxxxx xxxxxx 
1809 288314 2206295. 
To Spain To Italy 
Domestic. Foreign. Domestic Foreign. 
1803 $ 1745888 230221 1803 $ 376695 1208977 
1804 2304293 597143 1804 118441 1552708 
1805 2327155 1656312 1805 142475 2320099 
1806 1363285 1758954 1806 185346 4587727 
1807 1181231 3547907 1807 250257 5501226 
1608 542378 901003 1808 58085 1312173 
1809 1289220 1290003 1809 49206 1106539 
1810 3487951 1218601. 1810 71803 656691. 
To Belguim &Holland. To Denmark & Norway 
Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign 
1803 $ 1451710 2535239 1803 § 366550 334510 
1804 2064158 11757002 1804 477211 1155965 
1805 1783503 14959380 1805 455926 1481767 
1806 3609964 15015565 1806 356695 1052954 
1807 3098234 13086160 1807 572150 836468 
1808 382121 02227722 1808 11740 138863 
1809 421294 697070 1809 958584 3327766 
1810 74194 28992. 1810 3962739 654051. 
To Germany. 
Domestic Foreign. 
1803 $ 1542132 2057225 
1804 1358775 4302348 
1805 1039B17 2583010 
1806 1677687 4914651 
1807 912225 2248057 
1808 24963 204852 
1809 709981 1682662 
1810 1018713 644568. 
Per cent of exports to Europe. 
1803 66.77 
1804 66.06 
1805 63.57 
1806 63.95 
1807 65.40 
1808 30.00 
1809 64.80 
1810 70.14. 
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With these hills of exchange the American vessel would 
go to a British port where her lading was completed 
with British manufactures. Sometimes the American vessel 
went from h6me direct to a British port in which case 
that part of the dapgo in excess of the British con-
sumption was reexported to the continent by England 
acting as a middleman. This had been the course of 
American commerce previous to 1804. Subsequent 60 that 
date, changes in the methods of the neutral carrier were 
in evidence. The American intercourse with the continent 
was assuming a more direct character and in this situa-
tion Great Britain scented consequences fraught with 
grave injuries to her trade and commerce. She foresaw 
her merchantmen being relegated to a subordinate posi-
tion in the estimation of the nations. Such a position 
would be in direct contradiction to her traditions and 
hopes. Great Britain could not sit passively by ahd see 
her merchantmen removed to a secondary and less re-
numerative position. She would not permit without a 
struggle the loss of the continental markets for her 
wares and manufactures nor could she see her colonial 
produce supplanted on the continent by that tof the West 
Indies. British interests were bound to attempt some 
measures which would tend to prevent the United States 
from absorbing and from being absorbed by the continental 
trade. The development of a trade which tended to 
become more and mope direct with the continent meant 
16. 
the displacement of British manufactures by continental 
manufactures. British commerce was expected to suffer 
in proportion as the return lading of the trader con-
sisted of continental manufactures in place of British 
manufactures. British statesmen felt themselves duty-
bound to protect their commercial interests and to 
maintain the supremacy of Great Britain upon the sea. 
It is believed that the anxiety for the protection of 
commercial interests and for the maintenance of naval 
supremacy gave direction to British councils in these 
years. 
The relation of the American market to 
that of Great Britain was very important. The importance 
of this relation was none the less diminished because 
of the changed conditions described above. The authors 
of the Orders in Council seemed to have forgotten this 
or, rather, to have ignored it either from choiwe or 
from a misunderstanding of the situation. The principal 
demand for British manufactures came from America. The 
British manufactures consumed by America was far in excess 
of the amount of American produce consumed by Great 
Britain. The continuance of a free and unrestricted 
intercourse with the continent was necessary if America 
was to keep this adverse balance satisfactorily ad-
justed. The bills of exchange on London issued by the 
continental buyers of the American produce paid for the 
manufactured articles taken from England. It was to the 
17 
advantage of American interests to consider Great Britain 
as the principal source from which to draw her manu-
factured articles. British manufacturers undersold all 
rivals in the market. Just as England acted as a middle-
man for the distribution of American produce in a good 
many instances, so the United States served as a kind 
of distributing agency for British manufaatures when 
they were in escess of her own consumption. We have, 
thus, the development of a three-cornered trade relation, 
the continuance of which was of vital importance for the 
interests of all concerned and especially so for Great 
Britain. It was a matter of paramount importance that 
she should have open as many markets for her goods as 
it was possible to find and to maintain. The results 
of the industrial revolution and of the application 
of steam to macMnery emphasized the importance of 
this. Great Britain had now an increased capacity 
for the output of cotton and woolen goods and of 
hardware. The loss of markets in this period of develep-
ment might easily produce disastrous effects. The Orders 
in Council System was, doubtless, an attempt to secure 
these open markets and to establish, at the same time, 
a commercial monopoly for the British merchant. The 
decision to follow this course did not give due re-
cognition to the risk involved by incurring the ill-will 
of the United States. It was almost a certainty that the 
United States would consider the Orders as evidence of a 
18. 
policy of antagonism to her trading interests. It is veyy 
much open to question whether or not the British councils 
calculated upon the possibility of America turning from 
her agricultural interests to those of manufacturing as 
a result of the policy they were adopting. It was in thas 
fact that a serious blow could be, and was, dealt to Brit-
ish interests. The course of events succeeding the 
adoption of the Orders in Council Sy&tem indicates the 
great changes which were effected. The British ministers 
at that JBime, however, choose to attempt this experiment 
in commercial aggrandizement and to do it under the 
guise of retaliatory measures upon an enemy for abuses 
to her commercial interests. They defended the Orders as 
being retaliatory measures upon France. This was very 
largely a popular defense and obscured the real points 
at issue. We take it that this review of the commercial 
situation previous to 1807 points to commercial motives 
as predominant in the shaping of British policy. 
III. 
The British Restrictive System of 1807-1808. 
We have now to consider the British 
Restrictive Syatem of 1807-1808 and to see of what it 
consisted in the final form. The points of interest in 
this matter are: firstly, the connexion of a Whig 
ministry with the issuance of the Order of January 7th, 
1807 and of a Tory ministry with the issuance of those 
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of November 11th. This change in ministries, of politics 
so opposite in kind, is quite suggestive as to the policy 
we may expect to be contained and asserted in the 
issuance of the Orders; secondly, a report upon the 
commercial state of the West Indies presented to Par-
liament in July 1807; thirdly, the correspondence of 
Spencer Perceval with cabinet ministers concerning the 
adoption of measures against neutral commerce; finally, 
the completion, by the passage of laws, of a commercial 
system designed to make Great Britain the center of the 
world fs commerce. We hope to show by this the gro— 
'dominantly commercial motives which had to do with the 
development of the system and then to see to what extent 
those motives are reflected and put into practice by 
the system adopted. A consideration of these points 
will reveal, even more clearly, the extent to which 
commercial interests overshadowed and displaced re-
taliatory aims as the explanation of the Orders in 
Council System. 
May 16th, 1806, Great Britain issued 
a notification of blockade from the river Elbe to the 
port of Brest, both points inclusive. It was not a 
rigorous blockade. It permitted neutral vessels, laden 
with goods neither the property of British enemies nor 
contraband of war, to approach and to enter these ports; 
it permitted vessels to sail from these ports provided 
the port of destination did not belong to, or was not in 
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possession of, any of His Majesty's enemies. By the 
issuance of this order, Great Britain evidenced an 
apprehension of the result to herself of the neutral 
trade with France and with the Continent. Napolean 
either did not see this or overleoked it. He made the 
blockade order the pretext for the issuance of his Berlin 
Decree. In doing this, he disregarded the tendency of 
events and ignored experimental evidence as to the re-
sults of such restrictions upon neutral trade. The 
Directory, in January 1798, had attempted a similar 
Hi 
measure with disastrous results. 
The issuance of the Berlin Decree was a 
fortunate circumstance for Great Britain in that it 
furnished the pretext for the issuance of the Orders 
in Council which, under the guise of retaliatory measures 
upon France, struck at the netral carrying trade. 
Napolaen made a mistake when, by the issuance of the 
Berlin Decree, he imposed vexatious restrictions which 
would tend to keep the neutral out of his service. The 
natural tendency of the situation, after the issuance of 
the Berlin Decree, was to make for common interests 
between England and the United States. It was the 
business of Great Britain to assist and to encourage the 
American trader in finding opportunities for continuing 
his intercourse with the continent. He would have been 
a valuable agent for supplying the demands for British 
goods in those parts of the continent to which Great 
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B r i t a i n would not have had ready access . Gre&t B r i t a i n 
thot she was s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t whereas she needed co-opera-
t i o n and needed i t badly . Great B r i t a i n blundered when 
she did not take advantage of Napoleans mistake. The 
issuance of the Orders i n Councils placed the United 
S t a t e s between two f i r e s , the one builded by France the 
other by England. I t was r isky business to continue i n 
t h i s s i t u a t i o n a n d , f o r the moment, the American trader 
attempted to abandon the ocean. The r e s u l t s of t h i s i s 
n o t i c e a b l e i n a l l the trade s t a t i s t i c ^ f o r the p e r i o d . " 
The p o l i c y adopted by Great B r i t a i n interferred very 
s e r i o u s l y with the most remunerative branch of her 
f o r e i g n commerce, the d i r e c t trade with America. Further , 
i t c r i p p l e d her i n d i r e c t trade with the continent thru 
the agency of the United S t a t e s . The step was one which 
brot about serious consequences i n the course og B r i t i s h 
prosperi ty during the next few y e a r s . 
I t i s necessary to locate ourselves 
d e f i n i t e l y i f we would avoid confusion when speaking 
of the Orders i n C o u n c i l . Chronological ly , t h i s inquiry 
concerns i t s e l f with Orders issued on January 7th, 1807, 
November 11th, 1807 and A p r i l 26th, 1809. These dates 
roughly represent the period covered by the r i s e and 
f a l l of the Orders i n Council System. The Order of 
January 7th was issued by a Whig ministry ; the ]• others 
by a Tory m i n i s t r y . I t i s necessary to keep t h i s jboint 
i n mind when undertaking any inquiry into the p o l i c y of 
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the coast ing trdde of France. I t ^ p r i n c i p l e was the ^ 
r i g h t of r e t a l i a t i o n and, i n itQT~effect, i t was an 
extension of the Rule of 1756 so as to prohibit trade 
between any two h o s t i l e port^'5' I t ^ s operation was 
p a r t i c u l a r l y hard on American ships which had been i n 
the h a b i t og going from place to place i n Europe e i t h e r 
seeking the b e s t market or gathering a carg6V' I t was 
«a conservative and l e g i t i m a t e expression of r e t a l i a t i o n . 
of the Orders i n Council . v We discover , at once, "by i t thai 
the considerat ion of the matter was not above p o l i t i c s . 
I n the order of importance, we consider those of November 
11th to have given the f u l l e s t expression to the aims and 
the tendencies of B r i t i s h m i n i s t e r s . I t i s upon these , 
and upon the complemantary acts passed by Parliament, 
t h a t we center our a t t e n t i o n ; i t i s to these measures 
t h a t we r e f e r when speaking of the commercial system 
of the Orders i n C o u n c i l . They represent the f u l l e s t ex-
p r e s s i o n of t h i s attempt at the world-wide regulat ion 
of commerce f o r the purpose of subjecting i t to the 
i n t e r e s t s of Great B r i t a i n . They form the central port ion 
of our i n q u i r y . 
A Whig ministry had succeeded to power 
i n January^ 1806 and had continued u n t i l Apri l > 1807. 
The Tories were then restored under the leadership of 
Port land but i n r e a l i t y guided by Spencer Perceval . The 
Whigs were thus i n charge of the adxainistration at the 
time of the issuance of the B e r l i n Decree. Their reply 
to i t was the Order of January 7th . This Order aimed at 
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The Whigs were inclined to he more liberal 
with neutral commerce than the Tories were. This is 
revealed by the debates on the Order of Jnauary 7th. 
They began in Februaary. The most significant speech, 
made by Spencer Perceval, showed clearly the end towards 
which British legislation might be expected to approach. 
He gave expression to that everywhere prevailing desire 
to get at neutral commerce. This speech contains the 
germ of Perceval's theory of retaliation. He accepted 
without question the right of retaliation. He believed 
in the expediency of retaliation and argued that two 
objects be kept in view when resorting to these measures. 
The objects should be; firstly, an effort to most 
effectively counteract the evils to British commerce 
resulting from the measures of the enemy; secondly, 
an effort to most effectively "retort upon the enemy 
the evils of his own injustice". The attainment of 
the first of the two objects was the more important. 
He thot the chief effects of the Berlin Decree upon 
British commerce would be to occasion a greater in-
convenience in the introduction og British goods to the 
continent and, as a consequence, an advance in prices. 
However that might be, he did not think that the present 
measure had gone to the right spot and was dissatisfied 
with it. It was not extensive enough in it^TTperation. 
He did not consider that the greatest injury could be 
T 
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done to the enemy by striking at his coasting trade. 
That procedure would make no very serious impression 
upon him. It is here that Perceval showed the extent 
of his pretensions by proposing another plan, his plan, 
one that would prevent the importation of commodities 
from the colonies of France and Spain and the countries 
under their dominion. He wanted to get at the colonial 
trade of the enemy. He believed that measures could be 
enacted which would present thi s importation completely, 
which would sb advance the price of those colonial articj.es, 
which would make the means for their conveyance soAmore 
perilous, that British commodities could meet them 
satisfactorily in the European makkets. His essential 
interest thus showed itself to be that of getting 
British commerce on a favorable footing in the competition 
of the continental merchants. To him, there was no 
necessity for consulting neutrals as to the operation 
of t vese restrictions on the colonial tradej a reason-
able time for receiving notices of the acts was all 
that they might ask. He would attach no blame to Great 
Britain for the issuance of these measures because the 
enemy had forced her to adopt duch a policy. If the 
United States had any complaints to make they must be 
directed to France, the original aggressor, not to 
Great Britain. He suggested furthefc that it be made a 
requirement that no goods be carried to France except 
that they first touched at a British port, entered at 
the custom-house and paid a duty. This was a means for 
25. 
enhancing the price of goods in the foreign markets so & 
that British commodities would be able to find a better 
3/. 
sale there. This speech foreshadows the essential 
features of the system adoptdef in November. It has-
outlined a policy for a thoro-going blow at neutral 
commerce and has done it under the pretext of retaliating 
upon Prance. It gives expression to the deep concern for 
the welfare of British commerce of the continent. It 
desires to place them on an advantageous basis of competi-
tion in the continental markets. It is interesting to 
watch the development of this plan. 
The Whig defense adopted a conservative 
attitude and took care to point out the worth to Great 
Britain of neutral commerce with the British enemies. 
It indicated how America exported to continental nations 
but imported from England 5 how, to deprive the United 
States of her continental markets would be to take away 
her means of purchasing from Great Britain? how the 
countries of the enemy were a source of supply for 
some of the raw material which Great Britain used in her 
manufactures j how these materials might be obtained thru 
the agency of the neutral and how the intervention fef 
the neutral might serve to bring about the very thing to 
which Napolean was the most hostile, namely, the intro-
duction of British goods into countries under his control. 
Retaliation after this fashion could have been persisted 
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in with reasonable expectations for success. It saw 
sufficient reasons from abstaining from any measures 
severely injurious to the American commerce. The course 
of events might have been far different had a policy 
such as this prevailed. Commercial interests were 
too aggressive for it, however, and moulded the course 
which Great Britain followed. 
The next guide post which is to indicate 
to us that the spirit of commercialism was in the ascend**^ 
•ftYlf»y. QYirl w o o t o n ^ ^ g tiOWfliTll d th f I I'TTfTT "I MI l l P TT linn 
llfthij 10QJ7"iB to be found in an action instituted by 
the Portland ministry shortly after it had come into power 
in April. This was the appointment of a commission to 
investigate the commercial state of the West Indian 
islands. The committer was appointed July 9th. It was th 
report to the House T£*s proceedings from time to time 
and was to sit notwithstanding any adjournment of the 
House. Mr. Ellis reported from the committe July 27th. 
The report was ordered to lie on the table wnd with the 
appendix to be printed. It was printed August 8th. The 
House resolved, August 10th, to take it into considera-
tion early in the next session. August 14th Parliament 
was prorogued and did not flesume business until 
a s 
January 21st, 1808. There is nothing significant in 
the action taken upon this report. The report itself, 
however, is important as an indication of the British 
attitude towards neutral commerce. 
References for page 26. 
33. Commons Journals. Vol. LXII p. 669, 770, 835, 848. 
Members of the committee werej Mr. Dent, Mr. Long, 
Earl Temple, Mr. Bathurst, Mr. Evan Bailie, General 
Gascoyne, General Tarleton, Mr. Vansittart, Lord 
Viscount Castlereagh, Mr. Rose, Mr. Manning, Mr. 
Sharp, Mr. Lushingt&n, Mr. Bibbert, Mr. Alddrman 
Shaw, Sir Wm. Curtis, Mr. Dickinson, Mr. Hawkins 
Browne, Mr. Archibald Campbell, Mr. Tremayne, Mr. 
Geo Henry Rose, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Irving, Mr. 
Anthony Browne. 
87. 
The report of the committer strengthened 
the complaint against America as a neutral and a rival 
carrier. It was another link in the chain which was 
being forged to protect the sale of British manufactures 
on the continent. Tho ministers took no immediate action 
upon the report it must certainly have confirmed them in 
the adoption of any plans which they might have been 
considering. Two months later, the results of these 
plans are to be seen in the adoption of the urders 
in Council System of November 11th, 1807. 
The report states that the committe had 
found the condition of the West Indian planter to have 
progressively deteriorated since 1800j that the price 
of sugar had decreased while the cost of cultivatibn 
was steadily increasing; that the profits on the 
cultivation of sugar previous to 1800 had averaged about 
10$ but that since that time they had fallen to 2 l/2$ 
and 1 1/2$ and in some cases to no return of interest 
whatever. The committe suggested that a possible remedy 
for this situation would be an increase in the bounty 
allowed on exports, which measure would perhaps afford 
relief if accompanied by restrictive measures of such 
a character as to render the expenses on british and 
foreign produce equal in the continental markets. It 
oommented upon the very unfavorable state of the continen 
tal markets in the supplying of which the British 
merchant had formerly enjoyed nearly a monopoly but 
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where now he was scarcely able to enter into any 
competition whatever with the planter of the hostile 
colomies. The report attributed the primary reason for 
this condition to the "facility of intercourse between 
the hostile colonies o?" Europe under the American 
neutral flag by means of which not only the whole of their 
produce is carried to market but at charges little 
exceeding those pf peace: while the British planter is 
burdened with all the inconvenience, risk and expense 
resulting from a state of war? The primary recommendation 
of the report was of the following nature: "to counter-
balance, in some degree, the advantages thus enjoyed by 
the hostile colonies to the detriment of the British 
planter it has been recommended that a blockade of the 
ports of the enemies settlements be resorted to; such a 
measure, if it could be strictly enforced, would undoubt-
edly afford relief to our export trade. But a measure of 
more important and certain advantage would be the efl-
forcement of those restrictions on the trade between 
neutrals and the enemies1 colonies which were formerly 
maintained by Great Britain and ftom the relaxation of 
which the enemies1 colonies obtain indirectly, during 
war, all the advantages of peace; while our own colonies, 
in the intercourse with whom that system of monopoly which 
has bean held essential to the commercial and military 
navy of this country, is rigorously enforced, are de-
prived of the advantages of which, in former wars, they 
carried their produce to the foreign markets and which, 
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in the present war, by means of our decided naval 
superiority, would have amounted to the exclusive 
supply of the whole of Europe: and when those extra-
ordinary measures are taken into consideration which 
have been adtopted to exclude British colonial produce 
from the European market, it appears to be a matter of 
imperious and evident necessity to resort to such a system 
as, by impeding and resrticting, and, as far as 
possible, preventing the export of the produce of the 
enemies* colonies from the places of it rs growfh, shall 
compel the continent ©o heve recourse to the only source 
of supply which, in that event, would be open to it." 
The committe^had not been forgetful of 
the American relation to the West Indies. They investigat-
ed this and concluded that the trade between the United 
States and the West Indies was very convenient and ad-
vantageous and "one which the colonies could not re-
linquish without essential detriment unless it were 
compensated by other advantages, but that it was not 
essential to their existence nor equivalent to the 
disadvantages of their situation"• They ootoflid therefore 
conclude their report by saying that "unless some 
speedy and effecient measures of reliefer? are adopted 
the ruin of the great number of planters and of persons 
in this country hoMing Annuities and otherwise dependent 
upon these properties for their income must inevitably 
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soon take place, which must be followed by the loss o£ a 
vast capital advanced on securities in those countries 
and by the most fatal injury to the commercial, mari-
time and financial interests of Great Britain". 
The next trace we have of negotiations 
being conducted concerning neutral commerce is that of a 
letter from Lord Castlereagh to Spencer Perceval. Octob-
er 1 ^ , 1807.'And when we remember that Lord Castlereagh 
was a member of the committe on the commercial state of 
the West Indies this communication 6s of significance. 
It is as follows. "The more I have had time to reflect 
on our future prospects in this war. the more impressed 
I am with the conviction that neither peace nor independence 
can be the lot of this nation, till we have found the maans 
of making B'rance feeling that her new anti-social and 
anti-commercial system will not avail her against a power 
that can, ffer its own preservation, and consequently 
legitimately, counteract at sea what $she lawlessly 
inflicts and enforces on shore. I wish you would turn in 
your mind, whether we $are of necessity bound to post-
pone measures in furtherance of this great purpose with 
reference to the American question or whether, even 
upon the reservation of the late government, the right 
of retaliation may not be exercised by us without pre-
judice to these discussions. xxseewww: The details of 
such an arrangement will require much consideration: 
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the general principle is sufficiently obvious11. 
Perceval's reply to the communication 
of Lord Castlereagh was a paper of suggestions on the 
subject for the use of the Cabinet. It dealt principally 
with the policy and the justice of retaliation. The 
opinions of the various members Of the Cabinet con-
cerning the proposed measures were asked for and re-
ceived by Perceval. The course of this correspondence 
tends to indicate that it was the intention of Perceval 
and Castlereagh to force British commerce upon Frances 
not to take it from her. All the cabinet opinions were 
in the hands of Perceval by the end of Octobers and the 
task of drafting the proposed orders was begun. The 
draft was completed in the first days of November and sent 
to Lord Bathurst, President of the Board of Trade, who 
protested against the principle of the proposed orders, 
stating, in his reply, that the wobject of the proposed 
orders, tho general, was, in fact, nothing but the 
colonial trade carried on thru America" j and that it 
risked war with Russia and American without materially 
hurting Prance. The protest of Lord Bathurst, however, 
was ignored. Commercial interests had their spy and carried 
the day. American commerce was now to be checked in order 
to stimulate British commerce. The final form of the 
Orders differed greatly from the wording of the original 
draft . S C 
Reference for page 31. 
36. Adams, History of the U.S., Vol. IV. pp. 83-104. 
32 
Perceval and his supporters were proceding 
upon a belief in the theory of the self-sufficiency of 
Great Britain. This was the British maritime point of view 
wnd is expressed best in the words of Geo. Canning to 
£1. 
Lord Strangford. October. 22nd, 1807/ These words being 
with, 
contemporaryAund perhaps suggested by^the correspondence 
relative to the adoption of measures against neutrals a©e 
worthy of note as giving expression to the viewpoint 
of British ministers. Canning wrote as follows: 11 if e^er 
the period should arrive, which the rashness and the fuyy 
of Bonaparte are hastening, and to which the shutting of 
the ports of Portugal is one main step when Great 
Britain being excluded from all continental intercourse, 
by the willing or the forced consents of the governments 
of Europe, should cease to feel and common interest in 
them and shoiklid treat them all as one common enemy 
the nations who now flatter themselves that they are the 
most necessary to her existence, who fancy that the$r 
commerce is one of the mainsprings of her jbower, would 
perhaps be the first to feel that that power is not 
created by foreign commerce, tho the use of it is 
mitigated and controlled by the relations of Great Brit-
ain with the continent, that this country has in itself^ 
in its own consumption and its own colonies ample means 
of self-existence: and that in her intercourse with other 
nations she bestows more benefit than she receives, even 
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when that intercourse is supposed to he most beneficial 
and most studiously regulated in her favor*• 
Spencer Perceval in his correspondence 
does not deny the commercial character of the Orders. 
Writing to Ohas. Abbott, Speaker of the House of Commons, 
he says: "the short principle is that trade in British 
produce and manufactures and trade either from a British 
port or with a British destination is to be protected 
as much as possible. For this purpose, all the countries 
where French influence prevails to exclude the British 
flag shall have no trade but to or from this country or 
from its allies. All other countries, the few that remain 
strictly neutral (with the exception of the colonial trdde 
which backward and forward they may carry on ) cannot 
trade but thru this being done as an ally with any of 
the countries connected with France. If, therefore, we 
can accomplish our purpose, it will come to this, — that 
either those countries will have no trade, or they must 
be content to accept it thru us. This is a formidable 
and tremendous state of the world; but all the part of it 
which is particularly harrassing to English interests was 
existing thru the new severity with which Bonaparte's 
decrees of exclusion against our trade were called into 
action. Our proceding does not aggravate our distress 
from it. If he can keep out our trade he will; and he 
would do so,if he coiMfcd, independent of our orders. Our 
orders only add this circumstance; they say to the enemy, 
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fif you v/ill not have OUR trade, as far as we can help ±t, 
you shall have NONE; and as to so much of any trade as you 
can carry on yourselves, or others carry on with you 
thru us, if you admit it you shall pay for it. The d>nly 
trade, cheap and untaxed, which you shall have shall he 
either direct from us, in our own produce and manufactures, 
or from our allies whose increased prosperity will he an 
advantage to us t f l# 
The commercial system which was established 
November 11th, 1807 was a very complicated aff air; com-
prising the issuance of a series of Orders in Council and 
numerous instructions relating to them. Three Orders in 
Council were issued on November 11th. The first, an Order 
declaring the dominions of his Majestyfs enemies and of 
countries under their control to be in a state of block-
ade with exceptions specified in the Order; the second, 
an Order containing certain regulations under which 
trade to and from the countries of an enemy was to be 
carried on; the third, an Order declaring the future 
sale and transfer of vessels belonging to the enemy 
to the subjects of a neutral country to be ^invalid. 
These were followed, on November 18th, by a draft of 
instructions to commanders of his Majesty1 s ships of war 
and privateers to act in due conformity to and in ex-
ecution of the Order in Council of November 11th de-
claring the dominions of his Majesty's enemies to be in 
a state of blockade. Five Orders were issued on November 
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25th. The first, an Order approving a draft of instruction* 
to the commanders of ships of war and privateers for 
protecting goods going to or coming from any port of t&e 
United Kingdom, to whomsoever the property may appear to 
belong. The second, an Order establishing certain regula-
tions as to vessels clearing out from Great Britain with 
reference to the Order of November 11th. The third, an 
Order appointing the time at which notices concerning 
the effect of the Order in Council of November 11th shall 
be presumed to have been received at the different places 
specified in the Order. The fourth, an Order establishigg 
certain regulations as to vessels clearing out from 
ports of Gibraltar and Malta with refefence to the Order 
in Council of November 11th. The fifth, an Order respect-
ing the produce and manufactures of the enemy on boaBd 
British ships. Finally, 6n December 18th, an Order 
declaring that his Majesty's Orders of November 11th shall 
not extend to permit the produce of the colonies of an 
enemy to be brot direct to any British port in Europe/' 
The system here adopted asserted the 
"legal validity of a blockade which in most cases would 
be purely fictitious11 ̂ A n actual blockade, such as was 
asserted by these Orders, was beyond the powers even of 
the British navy. The ministry relied upon British 
maritime superiority to maintain the commerce and the 
shipping of England and to force the trade of the enemy 
to pass thru her ports. The chief object of the Orders 
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was to make Great Britain wthe center and the warehouse 
of the world's commerce*. Just as they aimed to make 
England the center of Europen and general commerce, so they 
aimed, by exceptions granted in these Orders, to enable 
the British colonies to become the centers of local 
commerce. The enemy was to have no trade^except thru 
Great Bfcitain and , in this trade, preference was to 
be given to British manufactures and produce. Such were 
the heights to which British pretensions aspired. 
Theoretically, they seemed possible of attainment: 
practically, they were accompanied by disastrous 
consequences to British domestic and foreign interefeis. 
England found that she was not self- sufficient. 
This system of commercualism was completed 
by Parliamentary action. 48 Geo. Ill c. 26., March 28th, 
43" A 1808, regulated the duties on the exportation of goods 
and completed the commercial rggulations under which 
trade was to be conducted. The preamble of the act 
stated that to accomplish the object of the late Orders 
in Council duties of customs must be granted upon certain 
goods when exported from Great Britain. These duties 
WBBe listed under three schedules. Schedule lfAfl applied 
to the exportation of foreign goods, wares and merchan-
dise, not being imported by the Eaafctlndis Company, 
which, upon importation, were allowed to be secured in 
warehouses without the payment of duties. Schedule1^11 
ajbjblied to the exportation of foreign goods, wares amd 
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Action on passage of this bill in House of Commons 
Feb fy 18th second reading of Orders in Council 
Bill mfeved; followed by lenghty debate; vote 
taken stood 214 tp 92 for the second reading. 
Later, consideration of Bill postponed by vote 
of 118 to 32. March 7th (Monday) Bill ordered 
to be read a third time on Thursday. March llhh 
Bill read third time; vote, 168 tp 68. 
Action on this Bill in the House of Lords. 
March 23rd House resolved itself into Committe 
of whole on the Bill and after considerable 
discussion agreed to the preamble of the Bill. 
March 25th Orders in Council Bill read third 
time. A number of amendments were offered by 
Lords Auckland and Grenville but all were 
negatived and the Bill was passed. Following 
the third reading and passage of the Bill 
giving effect ot the Orders in Council the 
following protest was enterend upon the Journals 
amd was signed by Grenville, Ponsonby, Nugent, 
St John, Spencer, Rawdon, Erskine, Essex, Grey, 
Lauderdale) Ponsonby (of Immohilly) Holland, 
Jersey, Clifton and Auckland. Points ofl dissent; 
(1) Passage of Bill violates standing Order 
of the House; (2) coupling of commercial 
regulations of the highest importance with the 
matter of aid and supply; the precipitancy 
with which the Bill had been hurried thru 
when evidence was about to be heard as to the 
effects of the Orders in Council; (3) considers 
the Orders in Council to be unjust, unnecessary 
and injuriois in the highest degree to the mofct 
important interests of the country. 
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merchandise, not imported by the East Indi a Company, 
which, upon importation, were not allowed to he secured 
in warehouses without the payment of duties. Schedule 
"C11 applied to the exportation of goods, wares amd mere 
chandise, the growth, produce or manufacture of any place 
within the charter limits of the East India Company, not 
having been imported by the said company. The ga<b£es 
were high enough, in many instances, to seem almost 
prohibitory. (See below for the schedules.) Further 
provisions of the act show how clearly the system was 
dominated by the idea of commercial monopoly. Vessels which 
might have sailed from certain ports before the times 
limited in the Orders in Council, should they come into 
or be brot into a British port pursuant to a warning 
given in accordance with the Orders in Council, were 
not to be prevented from proceding, without the payment 
of duties imposed by this act, to any port of a country 
in amity with his Majesty and from which the British 
flag was not excluded. But this, of course, could apply 
A% 
only to a few ships. Cotton wool or yarn and Jesuit's 
bark were excepted from this permit. Importers were 
allowed to warehouse goods under the general warehousing 
regulations. Warehoused goods might be destroyed at the 
owners request without the payment of duty and upon 
payment only of any charges and expenses that might have 
accrued on them. Warehoused goods had to be cleared witiiin 
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We have the following information ton this point. 
It is taken from a report of the number of neutral 
vessels which came into or were brot into a British 
port under the operation of the Orders in Council 
of November 11th, 1807. The report i§ dated March 
7th, 1808. The account is made up for 18 ports. 
70 American, 4 Portuguese, 1 Hamburg and 2 Brenem 
vessels came into thes eporte. Of the 70 American 
vessels 64 were held to have begun their voyage 
prior to the time when notice of the effect of the 
Orders in Council was held to have been received. 
One American vessel was brot into post for having 
proceded towards an enenyfi port after being warned 
not to do so. Five American vessels were held to have 
begun their voyage subsequent to the time notice 
of the Orders was held to have been received. 
25 of the 70 vessels remained in port at the time 
of this report; 3 had landed their cargoes and 
cleafted for America in ballast; 34 had sailed under 
certificates either for the original port or for 
a certified port; 3 had silled with kingfs license; 
4 sailed for London without certificate; one sailed 
for the original port without certificate . The 
other vessels remained in pott. 
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fifteen months either for exportation or for home consump-
tion. If the imported failed to remove the goods wibthinBi 
that time the customs commissioners sold the goods at 
public auction. The proceeds of such sale wane applied to 
the payment of storage charges. The overplus, if any, rant 
to the owner. If a price could not be obtained equal ttb 
the fullo amount of the duties and charges upon the goods 
they were to be effectually destroyed by the customs 
officers and the owner could have no claim to the value 
of goods so destroyed. Warehoused goods might be re-
exported to the country from which they were brot, or to 
the country owning the vessel in which the goods had bean 
imported, without the payment of duties imposed by this 
act, parting warehousfemg expenses only, provided that the 
British flag was not, at the time of reexportation, ex-
cluded from such country. All goods imported directly 
from the British coldmies were exempt from the payment 
of duties and could be exported to any port whatever. A 
similar exemption was given to all goods imported by the 
East India Company or undervthei* license. Permission 
was given to suspend this act by an Order in Council 
with respect to any country for the time being in amity 
with his Majesty and to allow the exportation to such 
countries of any goods, without the payment of duties 
for exportation and subject inly to such terms as his 
Majesty might think fit to impose. The King could pro-
hibit the exportation of goods to any country frtom which 
39 
the British flag was excluded. All moftfctjo accruing 
from the duties imppsed by this act were to be paid into 
his Majesty's exchequer and to be kept separate from alib 
other branches of the public revenue. The application 
of this money was to be voted by the House of Commons. 
l^tutV fill 48 Geo. Ill c. 38.m, April 14th, 1808, A 
permitted the importation of goods in any vessel what-
ever from countries from which the British flag was 
excluded. The attention Great Britain was paying to 
the sustaining of commerce is shown by the passage of 
this act. It meant the acceptance of enenies1 merchant 
ships as .carriers of British trade with the restricted k 
ports. A48 Geo. Ill c 71., June 18th, 1808, amended 48 A 
Geo. Ill c. 26. so as to permit the exportation of 
certain goods without the payment of duties. ̂48 Geo. JEII 
c. 126., Fune 30th, 1808, authorized the license system. 
The above account represents the completed 
commercial system as it was enacted by Orders in Council 
and by acts passed by Parliament. There is no open 
withdrawal from its pretensions until the issuance, 
in April 1809, of the modifying Order in Council by 
which the blockade limits were narroweft to a much smaller 
portion of the European coast. Meantime, as we shall see 
later, Great Britain employed a very expensive practice of 
mitigating and relaxing her belligerent declarations by 
means of the license system. 
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Opposition in Parliament to the Orders in Council. 
We have now to consider the opposition to 
the Orders in Council as it was expressed in Parliament 
during the sessions of 1808 and 1809. In reviewing the 
session of 1808, January 21st to July 4th, we may con-
sider it i/fif three lines of action. These are; first, 
the presentation of petitions for peace and of petitions 
against the Orders in Council as representing a useless 
attempt to secufe an alteration in the policy of the 
administration; second, the course adopted by the Whigs 
in their oppesition to and condemnation of the Orders in 
Council of November 11th; third, the method of defense, 
in so far as any was affirmed by the Tory ministers, in 
meeting the contentions of the oppositifen. The points to 
be brot out by this consideration have a direct bearing 
upon the belief that the Orders in Council System represents 
an attempt to establish a monopoly of commerce for the 
interests of Great Britain. 
The movement for petitioning ministers 
to open negotiations for peace appears to have become 
quite general by the time for the opening of this session. 
The Tories objected to the presentation of the petitions 
and were inclined to attribute them to party influence 
rather than to actual distresses. Thw Whigs denied that 
party influence had been used to secure the petitions 
41. 
and defendeddthem as constitutional means of giving ex-
pression to3 the distress which they were experiencing. 
The Whigs were willing to encourage the petitions as a 
means of bringing the ministry to an attitude favorable 
towards the negotiation of peace. The Tories, on the 
other hand, opposed the presentation of petitions on 
the grounds that the acquisition of peace would be re-
tarded, that ministers Vjtould be embarrassed in their 
negotiations and that negotiation on any basis but thaj 
of equality and independence would be premature and thereby 
defeat the hopes of the petitioners. The petitions did 
not accomplish anything. They were allowed to be read add 
Were then ordered to lie on the table. Such was the fate 
of the petitions for peace from the inhabitants of Bolton 
and of Oldham in Lancaster. The petitioners cited the 
depressed state of manufactures, the consequent reduced 
price of labor and the threatened want of employment. TJais 
situation was attributed to the unfavorable state of 
foreign commerce as a result of the war. They urged the 
necessity for the restoration of peace and asked that 
negotiations be undertaken to effect that end. 
Organized opposition to the Orders in 
Council on the part of the manufacturers and merchants 
was in evidence by the early part of March. A petition 
respecting the Orders in Council signed by 400 merchants 
of Liverpool was presented March 3rd. The Speaker stated 
that the usage of the House prevented the reception of 
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a petition against a duty bill and unless it could be 
shown that the petition was otherwise it could not be 
accepted. Following a short debate, a vote was taken on 
receiving the petition. The result was 80 tool28/ or a 
majority of 48 against receiving it. The following day 
there was presented a petition, against the Orders in 
Council, framed in consequence of the rejection of the 
Liverpool petition. It was rejected by a vote of 57 to 
m . * v 
March 10th Alderman Combe presented a peti-
tion from the merchants and manufactuBsrs of London 
praying to be he*rd befor the House with evidence against 
the Orders. The petition was read by the clerk and 
ordered to lie on the table. The petitioners recited 
their belief that the Orders were ruinous to their 
private interests and to the commerce and manufactures 
of the empire at large. The Orders had been recommended 
by an opinion that they would be beneficial to the commercial 
interests of the country. This the petitioners believed 
to be an erroneous opinion. The relation of American 
commerce to Great Britain, the interdependence of the 
two countries and the American trader as a circulating 
agent for British produce and manufactures in the enemies 
A, 
dominions were points which the petitioners emphasized. 
The presentation o£ such evidence did not 
alter the determination of ministers to persist in their 
policy. They ignored the evidence of petitions and were 
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hastening to the passage of the Orders in Council hill. 
They did agree, however, to refer the Orders to a committe 
of the whole House in order that Mie petitioners might be 
heard but only with the understanding that evidence was 
not to be submitted against the Orders in Council bill. 
The petitioners thus got their case before Parliament. 
They were represented by Henry Brougham whose efforts, 
exhaustive tho they were, produced no results in this 
was increased several fold and ministers could no longer 
a|r^ord to disregard the exhaustion of British domestic 
interests that attention was given to modifying the Orders 
in an attempt to mitigate their rigors. 
to the Order in Council of November 11th. It centers 
around those Whigs who had been members of the juofr 
preceding ministry. 
Order on the opening day of the session, January 21st. 
He questioned the constitutionality, the expediency, the 
justice of the Order and the authority for saying to 
America, as the Orders distinctly expressed, "not a ship 
of yours shall sail which sBiall not be made subject to 
confiscation by us or to conditions which will subject 
it to confiscation by the enemy11. This speech gives 
direction to the opposition during the remainder of the 
session. These characteristic notes are, in addition to 
until the strength of the opposition 
We turn now to the course of the opposit6on 
Lord Grenville began his criticism of the 
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the attack on the grounds of constitutionality, expediency 
and justice of thr Orders, the difference between the 
Order of January 7th and the one of November 11th, the 
inefficacy of the Berlin decree without the aid of the 
Orders in Council, the criticism to be borne by Great 
Britain for a system originated by Prance and the 
necessity for avoiding an open rupture with, tail the 
hostility of, America.^' 
Lord Auckland, Janp^ry 27th, urged an 
explicit and prompt avowal of the object, the meaning^ 
and the presBmmd effects of the Orders in Council. 
Grenville seconded Auckland in urging this speedy ex-
planation and full discussion of the Orders. These 
efforts produced no results. The Tory ministers did not 
supply the explanation demanded. 
The Whigs obtained but little satisfaction 
from the ministers during the entire session. Pebrurary 
18th Lord Grenville moved for c&pies or extracts of all 
information received by the government previous to 
November 11th, 1807 showing that the French government 
had begun to execute its decrees with increased vigor 
as was asserted in the preamble of the Order of November 
11th. The motion was carried, 47 to 38. We can find no 
record of this information being supplied. The ministers 
were not at all disposed to comply with this request. The 
Whigs presented resoMitions also supporting their 
contention that there was no evidence concerning the 
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increased rigor in the enforcement of the Beelin Decree 
but they were unable to effect anything by this means. 
The only return they reveived was an increased dissatis-
faction with the existing ministry and its policy. 
March 8th Lord Ermine made a very extenfiive 
attack upon the attitude of ministers and their policy 
with respects to the Orders in Council. A somewhat close 
attention to its more interesting points will perhaps 
be wofchh while. He criticised the state of Parliamentary 
action by which no satiaf actory discussion of the Orders 
had resulted. The ministers had continually avoided 
a presentation of facts upon which to base a reasonable 
decision and could not be induced to defend their measures 
in other than loose and general terms. The entire course 
of procedure followed by ministers in this matter was 
such as to cast suspicion upon the purpose and aim with 
which they had and were acting. Tho the magnitude of 
the measures which they were considering was akin to a 
commercial revolution and tho it risked the friendship 
of America, yet ministers not only did not cill 
Parliament for its counsel but, by repeated prorogations, 
prevented it from assembling. The subject was too 
complicated for the private councils of the cromi. Further, 
they had not all considered its certain consequenees as 
was shown by the fact of the issuance of the first Order, 
tho operative upon distant countries, without the issuance 
of notices which in less than a week afterwards they 
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acknowledged to be indisponsible. That the Orders were 
not matured measures is further shown by the issuance of 
the numerous supplemental Orders, explanations and 
instructions. He pointed out another fact which argued 
for dissimilarity in the Orders of January 7th and of 
November 11th. The Tory ministers had made no communica-
tion, either directly or indirectly, with their pre-
decessors before issuing the Order. Now, altho they had 
previously disparaged the Whig councils as weak and 
incapable, they cite them as authority for their own 
acts. Such a procedure was rather disconcerting to the 
Whigs. These points furnish a good commentary upon the 
conditions under which the Orders in Council System was 
developed.^ 
The Whigs, at this time, could do nothing 
more than keep alive the agitation against the Tory Orders 
in Council. They did this by continuing their attacks 
on the lines which we have indicated. 
We have now to consider the method of 
defense used by the Tories in their answers to the Whig 
demands. They offered no detailed explanation of the 
measures, such as the mefcits of the situation demanded. 
In this respect, a study of the Parliamentary is disappoint-
ing. It was frequently stated that this desired information 
would be given soon but no record is found of its being 
presented. Ministers had their own reasons for such dila-
tory tactics and, too, they were in the majority and in 
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charge of the administration. There are, however, frequent 
statements by ministers and their supporters which give 
some indication as to the defense they were inclined to 
adopt. The worth of this evidence is that it all points 
to commercial condiderations as being predominant motives 
in the adoption of and the continuance in the Orders in 
Council policy. This is revealed thru the ministerial 
attitude towards the American situation; thru their 
defense of the principle of retaliation and the extent 
to which fhey believed Great Britain justified in using 
it; thru statements having a direct bearing upon the 
commercial aims of the Orders. 
The Tories were not nearly so liberal as 
the Whigs in their attitude towards American They would 
adhere strictly to the "maritime rights of Great Britain" 
and the defense of their naval rights against, what was 
considered, the aggressions of America. They endeavored 
to discourage all talk of war with Americans and made 
light of th© results of such a war if it should occur. 
Prom a belligerent point of view they did not consider 
America a serious fact. Bord Castlereagh gave typical 
expression to this attitude by saying that "the consequence 
of a war would be the loss £o America of her whole 
export trade whilst only one foufcth of our exports would 
be endangered by that event. Our means of shutting 
American produce in her ports, in consequence of our 
great marine, were far more extensive than her internal 
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means of excluding us and consequently a considerable portion 
of what this country now exported to America would find 
it3 way into that country notwithstanding a war. We are 
not, from the mere apprehensions of a war with that 
country, to shrink from the assertion of those maritime s 
rights so essential to our national strength and prosperity11 • 
Great Britain felt secure in maritime superiority and 
relied upon it to bring her success. She was bent on 
maintaining intact this source of her strength. 
Ministers based the justification of their 
Orders upon the measure of France. They argued that the 
Orders were necessary as measures of self-preservation 
and that Great Britain had a right to go as far as France 
had gone in her measures against commerce. They did not 
feel constrained to abide by the law of nations when 
France was not; and as for injuries to neutrals, these 
would be but consequential to the measures directed 
against the enemy. The neutral could have no just cause 
for complaint Great Britain in case of injury. Great 
Britain was not at fault; the adoption of these Orders 
had been unavoidable and indispensible for the preser-
vation of British power. France was the first offender 
and it was necessarily to her that America must go with 
any demands for reparation which she might choose to 
present. Such was the defense of the principle of 
retaliation urged by the Tories. It permitted the 
establishment of a European blockade.^ 
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There i^-ye** running thru the defense of 
the ministers, an undercurrent of sentiment identified 
with commercial interests which occasionally appear on 
the surface. These statements are important as they tend 
to get at the true intent and meaning of the Orders in 
Council. They furnish ^ positive evidence. It was admitted 
that the surplus of the produce of the British colonies 
over the English consumption was not able to supply the 
demands on the continent. A circuitfcuas trade thru 
Great Britain was therefore to be permitted with the 
enemies1 colonies and on this a duty was to be placed*c» 
sufficiently high as to prevent its having an advantage* 
over the British colonial produce in the European. markets. 
Such a measure was of course contradictory to their 
declared intentions of starving the enemy. This plan 
constituted the revenue aspect of the Orders in Council 
System. 
The other aspect of the System was the bibow 
at the foreign commerce of Prance. It was asserted that 
Great Britain derived but little advantage from her 
maritime superiority, while France, who did not dare 
show a flag on the ocean, had carried on an extensive 
trade in neutral bottoms and was thus enabled to consume 
colonial produce at a much less rate than the English. 
France was enjoying by this means all the advantages of 
peace while British trade was suffering under depression. 
to* 
To prevent this was the great object of the Orders. It 
is believed that something like this is the true explanation 
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of the Orders in Council. 
Between the closing of this session and 
the bpening of the next, in January 1809, the situation 
had altered sufficiently to change the attitude of the 
Tories towards to opposition and the policy of the °rdess# 
Great Britain was experiencing a great deal of distress 
bothin her domestin and in her foreign affairs. The 
government was weak and the opposition of the press was 
growing. The commercial system which had been established 
seemed to be creating the very evils which it was made 
to counteract. The attempt to make Engliind a warehouse 
U 
for the wworlds commerce was proving a failure. The 
embarrassed situation og the ministry made it an im-
possibility to assume the same attitude towards the 
commercial policy involved in the Orders as had been 
assumed in the former session. 
To get at the real motive for the modifica-
tion Order of April 26th, 1809 should be an essential 
part of an inquiry which concerns itself with the policy 
of the Orders in Council. This paper, however, has to 
offer no satisfactory explanation of this point; it can 
only give af few suggestions that have come as the result 
of this inquiry. We do not feel that the modification 
Order was essentially an effort to conciliate America. 
The real reason must lie in other than conciliatory 
motives as will be suggested by glancing at statistics 
on the commercial situation subsequent to the issuance 
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of the Order of November 11th and noting the close 
connexion of that situation with the •>issuance of 
that Order. We believe that the situation which had 
resulted was so far different from what had been anticipate 
ed as to hold the key to the understanding of Sss^wb^ v 
ef-the Order of 1809. £his, however, because of the 
lack of available material, we are unable to establish 
at this time. It is presented here only as a tentative 
suggestion which may be confirmed later by further 
inquiry. 
fragmentary account of the procedings concerning t^^Ufc^ 
modification' of the Orders in Council System as was 
made before the close of this session. A study of the 
History for this period affords us but little valuable 
material for the solution of our question as to the why 
of the modification. The deliberations which ted to it 
are recorded elsewhree. The retraction of the Orders 
was not the direct result of Parliamentary deliberations. 
It was made thru Cabinet action. To the ©ecord of this 
action we do not have access now. 
the viewpoint of the policy formulated in the Orders in 
Council, is that made by James Stephen. This speech 
confined itself almost entirely to the commercial aspects 
of the Orders. Its dominating interests were in the 
commercial welfare of Great Britain. It is sort of a 
The Parliamentary History gives but a 
The important speech of this session, from 
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sequel to "War in Disguise* • When it is remembered how 
intimately Stephen has been connected with the Orders in 
Council System, we are ready to give some weight to his 
words and, if his speech is to he accepted as the official 
defense of the Orders, to ask that hhe opinion of the 
Orders as primarily measures of retaliation of France 
he no longer accepted. It is to secure the acceptance 
of this viewpoint that this paper bends its efforts. 
Stephen was opposed to any repeal or 
relaxation of the Orders. He considered them to be 
just measures and held that their true intention was 
remedial and self-defensive. They were to be self-
defensive as an answer to the Berlin Decree and to 
Napoleanfs system of excluding British commerce from 
the continent. Existing conditions had necessitated, on 
the part of Great Britain, some such action as was advanced 
in the Orders if she were to continue an intercourse with 
the continent or even with America. He insisted that 
the benefits bf the American indirect trade with the 
continent was already practically lost because of the 
Embargo and Non-Intercourse. Reckoning without these, it 
would soon be discontinued anyway by reason of the enforce-
ment of the Befclin Decree. The result would be the loss 
of the American market for the British manufactures. The 
system of continental remittances thru bills of exchange 
on London could be expected to diminish in the same 
proportion as British manufactures were dupplanted by 
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European manufactures in the supply of the American and 
the West Indian markets. Thus he considered the growth 
of the American direct trade with the continent as 
essentially detrimental interests of Great Britain. The 
use of continental manufactures as substitutes for those 
of the British make must continue to grow and the "habitual 
preference11 for British manufactures in the American 
markets would soon be lost forever. "These would have 
been the natural and sure effects of the security, 
facility and advantage of taking returns for the products 
of the New World and of the East Indies directly from 
the continent as compared with th© risk and the consequent 
heavy charges to be sustained in the same way by trading 
with the blockaded British isles". An exclusive consump-
tion of continental wares in her home markets, in the 
foreign West Indies and in the other foreign markets of 
the New World would soon have become absolutely necessary 
to the interests of American commerce. Thus Great Britain 
stood in danger of being shut out exclusively from 
supplying any of the markets of the New World. And herein 
the remedial aspect of the Orders in Council. Great 
Britain must somehow retain the trade beyond the Atlantic. 
It was therefore necessary to institute a system which 
would offer effectual interference to the further growth 
and development of the independence of American commerce. 
The revenue and the strength of the navy of Great Britain 
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depended upon the maintenance of her maritime superiority. 
It was to accomplish this that the Orders in Council had 
been undertaken. 
The Order in Council of April 26th^l809/ 
marks the modification of the commercial system as it had 
been formulated in 1807-1808. The reasons assigned for 
this were the 11 divers events whic have taken place scxx. 
affecting the relations between Great Britain and the 
territoties of the other powers*• All previous Orders 
were revoked and annulled with the exceptions afterwards 
expressed in the new Order. The blockade was narrowed to 
the coasts of Prance, Holland and so much of Northern 
Italy as was under the domination of Napolean. Vessels 
were to be allowed immediate access to any port legalized 
by the Order, tho such access had been illegal under the 
former Orders. No interference was to be offered to any 
ship proceding towards these ports. This haste to make 
good the change may be some indication to the cause 
which prompted it. 
V. 
Results of the Restrictive Measures. 
Our concern thus far has been with what 
we may call the thporeticailside of the Orders in Council 
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System. We have endeavored to trace the development of 
the factors concerned in the origination of the Orders 
and have tried to show that the incorporation of these 
factors in the System, as it was completed in the early 
months of 1808, has made for the creation of an extensive 
plan for subjecting all commerce, and particularly that 
of the United States, to the interests of Great Britain. 
The survey of the commercial situation previous tp 1807, 
the tracing of the development of the System during 
1807-1808 and the study of the Parliamentary History, 
all these have shown the British devotion to the idea 
that their commercial and maritime superiority was of 
primary importance and must be maintained. 
We turn now to another side of the System, 
that of actual practice and results. In doing this, we hhall 
follow a two-fold plan of consideration. Statistics con-
cerning Great BritaiAs1 commercial relations in 1808 furmish 
some suggestions as to why the modification Order was 
issued in 1809. It is our first concern to indicate theee. 
Having done that, we shall then consider the methods of 
the license practice. Our purpose is to show, in the first 
instance, the effects of the Orders in Council upon 
British commerce and, in the second instance, to show 
more clearly the commercial aspect of the System when 
interpreted by the license practice. 
Prices of grain and privisions gradually 
U 
increased after 1805. The production of manufactures 
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stood at a minimum. Many laborers were without employment 
and suffered severely because of the high prices. The 
extent of their distress is partially indicated by the 
many petition against the pfi><bicy of the Orders in Council 
presented to Parliament by the manufacturers of London, 
Liverpool etc.The existence of a very extensive pamphlet 
literature against the Orders also indicates distressing 
conditions in home affairs. This was due, in a large 
measure, to the attempt at making Great Britain the center 
of the world's commerce. An excessive amount of foreign 
goods had accumulated in the British warehouses. The West 
Indian and the South American produce, now deprived of the 
American carrier for the European markets, found its way 
to England and increased t^e oversupply of produce there. 
The business of the British merchant was seriously 
interrupted by these conditions^' 
The intercourse of Great Britain with the 
American and the continental markets was greatly 
diminished in 1808.It does not appear to have been so 
seriously affected in the period succeeding the issuance 
of the Order of January 7th as it was in the period 
succeeding the issuance of those Orders of November 11th. 
The adverse variations which take place in these trade 
relations is so closely connected with the enforcement of 
the Orders in Council System that it seems at once 
possible to attribute these results to the working 
conditions of the System. It was in this respect that 
British commercial interests suffered grievously. By this 
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means it was shown that the policy of Great Britain could 
not continue so aggressive. 
The amount of cotton imported by Great 
Britain from the United States during 1808 shows a 
progressive diminution fo« each successive quarter of the 
year and is about thirty two million pounds less than 
the amount imported in 1807. The amount imported in 1807 
was an increase of neaifcy seventeen million pounds over* 
that of the previous year. The Orders in Council and the 
Embargo are responsible for the large recrease in 1808. 
The situation with respect to the importation of cotton 
from the continent of Europe for the same years is quite 
similar altho not exactly parallel. The amount imported 
in 1807 is about three million pounds less than the amount 
imported in 1806. The importation in 1808 was about two 
anda half million pounds less than in 1807-'? 
The table given below is self-explanatory 
concerning the almost complete interruption of commercial , 
relations with the United States. The facts therein are 
to be attributed to the operation of the Orders in Council 
and the Embargo. 
The official value of exports from Great 
Britain to the continent of Europe in 1806 was £13216386; 
in 1807 was 12,689̂ 590? in 1808 was iill^80;490. The official 
amount of imports from the continent of Europe into Great 
Britain for 1806 was L8197256J for 1807 was 1^973,510? for 
1808 was £4,210,671. The official value of prize goods for 
1806 was £73^938} for 1807 was L83^852j for 1808 was 
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Amount of Cotton Wool imported into Great Britain in 
years ending January 5th, 1807, 1808, 1809. 
Quarter ending Imported from 
1806-1807. United States Continent of Europe. 
April 5th 6896244 founds 2202938pounds. 
July 5 th 7644844 " 1497767 " 
Oct. 10 th 8903421 " 1700126 " 
Jany 5th 4104884 " 1970167 n 
Totals - -27549393 n 7371048 " 
1807-1808. - ~ 
April 5th 9277484 w 2429673 " 
July 5th 10827705 " 489012 n 
Oct. 10 th 15105407 w 655894 w 
Jany 5th 8879483 n 1169(112 w 
Totals - 44090079 w 4743591 • 
1808-1809. 
April 5th 9004849 " 886442 " 
July 5th 2537942 n 379833 M 
Oct. 10 th 476962 M 485255 w 
Jany. 5th 208644 " 692260 n 
Totals - 12228397 " 2433111 " 
68. Commons Journals, Vol. LXVTI. Appendix p. 761. 
tt w " LXIV. 11 p. 648. 
(See following page.) 
Imports Sxtdm and exports to United States from Great Britain 
Number of ships 
employed. 
Official value Entered Cleared 
of inwards. outwards. 
Imports. Exports. Br. Amer. Br. Amer. 
1805- £.1766556 - -L7146765 - 72 - 427 - 52 - 452 
1806- 1999884 - 8613124 - 54 - 539 - 39 - 558 
1807- 2847522 - 7921120 - 84 - 653 - 38 - 706 
1808- 836342 - 3992060 - 12 - 1S4 - 56 - 217 
1809- 2205331 - 5187615 - 44 - 616 - 51 - 473 
1810- 2614605 - 7813317 - 35 - 692 - 99 - 645 
Imports into Great Britain from United States. 
1806-7. 1807-8. 1808-9. 
1st Quarter - 510677 603470 482028 
2nd " - 490251 662880 266950 
3rd " - 641085 991835 77666 
4th " - 357871 589337 9836 
Total 1999884 2847522 836480 
Exports from Great Britain to United States. 
1st Quarter -2392527* 2642798 977730 
120106 67833 7853 
2nd n 2199065 1834451 864074 
82878 29809 8483 
3rd it 2969011 2914589 1741974 
111306 19559 
4th i t 719117 349754 
19112 7396 22632. 
Total 8613122. 7921120. 3992059. 
* Top line = British manufactures 
Lower line = Foreign merchandise. 
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L1774752. 
A further affect of this new commercial y 
system which excluded the American carrier by its re-
quirements was to transfer a large amount of th© trade to 
European flags. From 1807 tp 1810 the was a diminution 
of 7750 British seamen engaged in the European trade and 
an increase of 12324 in the number of foreigners engaged 
in that traded It was to considerations such as these, 
which were contrary to the expectations and aims of the 
Orders in Council System, that we believe it possible to 
attribute the modification Order of Apfcil 26th 1809. 
However disastrous the Orders in Council 
System may have been upon British commerce, it would have 
been much more so had it been rigidly enforced. In fact 
fad 
it was greatly relaxed by the license practice* its 
A 
natural operation was greatly counteracted by this means. 
In addition to this practice, to counteract the natural 
operation of the Orders, there were accidental circumstances 
such as the opening of Spain and Portugal to Great Britain 
and the practice of a large body of American adventurers 
working on the assumption of the non-enforcement of the 
Embargo. 
The license practice consisted of an 
aggregation of individual permissions to carry on a traffic 
ii- rr—" *** 
forbidden by the existing laws of Great Britain. IP^S 
purpose was to diminish the inconvenience resulting to 
Great Britain from the closing of the continental ports 
References for page 53. 
69. Commons Journals Vol. LXffll Appendix p. 761. 
70- Parliamentary Debates. Vol. XVII. p. 547. 
71. Mahan. Sea Power xxx French Rev. Vol. II.. P* 307. 
59 
to her wares. It was also for the purpose of ministering 
to the demands of the continent. The intercourse with 
the continent was continued in this manner despite all 
prohibitions to the contrary. The granting of every licnnse 
was in contravention of the British declaration of hostility 
to Prance and was a relaxation of her aggressive retaliation 
upon the enemy. The Orders in Council professed to 
institute a severe system of deprivation of necessities 
from Prance but now the severity and hardships that would 
result from the enforcement of these measures was mitigated 
by the license practice. This practice, at its face value, 
is to be accepted in no other light than as commercial 
in its mofives and methods. 
The existence of the license practice side 
by side with the Orders in Council was not consistent 
policy on the part of British councils if they were to 
defend themselves on any principle but that of commercial 
regulation and the establishment of monopolistic privilgges. 
The Orders w&en accompanied by the license practice could 
not be strictly retaliatory upon Prance and Napolean for 
11 retorting upon the enemy the evils of his own injustice" 
since they permitted a lasge trade to be carried on between 
Great Britain and the continental ports which the 
Continental blockade professed to close. Every vessel 
holding a British license was admitted to any port from 
which the Orders in Council excluded them. Altho the Orders 
operated to prevent a neutral from thpding directly with 
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Prance or any country under her dominion they did not 
prevent the cargo of that neutral being taken to these 
same ports if done so under authority of a license. Great 
Britain was prepared by the license traffic to take every 
opportunity to introduce to the continent at any point and 
by any agency all merchandise which came from her ware-
houses* Such a practice was not a means calculated to 
starve the continent into submission. It was more the 
expression of a willingness and desjre to feed the continent 
upon profitable terms than it was to occasion privation 
and want. The only defense for the license practice was* 
that the Orders in Council could not be carried omt 
rigidly and that it facilitated British trade. 
The license practice hade existed before 
the time of the Orders in Council. Its coexistence with 
them was established in 1808. 48 Geo.Ill c. 126, June 30th. 
1808 authorized the granting of licenses. The act gave 
permission to remove goods sec&red in ware-houses in the 
port of London to the out-ports for exportation to any 
part of Europe. Licenses requiring the Sign Manual of 
his Majesty were to be granted by one of his Majesty's 
principal secretaries of State pursuant to the authority 
of any Order in Council. A copy of the Order in Council 
was required to be attached to the license as authority 
for issuMg it. The act also authorized the exportation 
of goods in vessels of less burdeh than were then allowdd 
by the existing laws. 
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We give below1 a copy of one of these licenses 
granted in accordance with the provisions of the above 
mentioned act. It was granted to an American vessel July 
14th, 1812 but, being under the act cited, its form is 
that of all other licenses which were issued for trading 
purposes. The requirements complied with in the obtainance 
of this license furnishe us the essential acquaintance 
with the methods and details of the license practice. 
Anyone who would engage in the business of the license t 
traffic had to meet the foll«x2tLng requirements? J.j.rst,, he 
must petition the Lords of his Majesty1s Privy Council 
for an Order in Council granting him permission to export 
a cargoj second, the Lords granted this privilege by 
issuing an Order in Council which was to be taken to the 
clerks in his Majesty's Privy Council office and there 
recorded by them. A fee was collected for this registrations 
third, having secured the registration of the Order it 
was necessary to procede to w&e of the principal secretaries 
of State to present the Order as authority for the 
issuance of a license. The license granted, a fee collected 
and the public stamp added before the license was delivered. 
The license was then taken to the port of lading where 
the cargo was £aid for in accordance with the duties 
imposed by schedules 11 A*, ffBtf and "0" of 48 Geo III c. 126. 
The certification by the customs officers completed the 
form of the license. Its final form was, than, the license 
itself certified by the customs officers and to it was 
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f,To all commanders of His Majesty's ships 
of war and privateers and all others whom it may concern,--
Greeting:- I, the undersigned, one of His Majesty's principal 
Secretaires of State, in pursuance of the authority given 
me by His Majesty by Order in Council, under and by virtue 
of powers given to His Majesty by an act passed in the 48th 
year of His Majesty's reign, entitled 'an act to permit 
goods secured in warehouses in the port of London to be© 
removed to the outports for exportation to any port of Europe: 
for empowering His Majesty to direct that licenses which 
His Majesty is authorized to grant under His Sign Manual 
may be grabted by one of his principal Secretaries of 
State, and for enabling His Majesty to permit the exportation 
of g o o d 3 in vessels of less burden than are now allowed 
by law, during the present hostilities and until one month 
after the signing of the preliminary articj.es of peace' 
and in pursuance of an Order in Council as hereunto annexed, 
do hereby grant this lecense for the purpose set forth in 
the said Order in Council to W B -& Co. of Liverpool; 
and do hereby permit them to export on board the American 
ship N of about 200 tons burden, J.C ., Master, 
from Liverpool, direct to any port of the United Statesof 
America, a cargo consisting of such goods as are permitted 
by law to be exported ( being either British or American 
property) and protecting the said Vessel, and the goods as 
aforesaid laden therein, from capture or molestation by 
any ship of war or privateer bearing His Majesty's commission, 
on account of any hostilities that may exist during the 
time of the sais voyage and during her return to the pott 
of Liverpool with the said cargo, in case the said vessel 
shall not be permitted to land the same, or any part thereof, 
in any port of the United States j the master to be permitted 
to receive his freight and depadt with his crew and vessel 
in ballast to any port, not blockaded: Provided, the veseel 
taking the benefit of this Ifecense shall clear out from 
the port of shipment in the United Kingdom before the 
15th of August next and the time of clearance from the 
poet of lading shall be endorsed on this license. This 
license to remain in force for one voyage only1'. 
Given at Whitehall the 14th of July, 1812 in the 
52nd year of His Majesty's reign. 
(Signed ) Sidmouth. 
Endorsed — Port Liverpool. 
This is to certify that the ship or vessel 
called the H of Baltimore, Md., of the burden of 285 
tons, whereog J.C . is master hath this day been cleared 
outwards for Baltimore described in the corkets granted 
for shipping the same. 
Given uhder our hands and seals of office at 
the custom house, this 23rd day of July, in the year of our Lord 1812. 
(Signed.) Itavaenisn, Collector. 
(Signed.) Israel Wood, Comptroller. 
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At the Council Chamber. Whitehall. 
the 14th of July. 1312. 
Present 
The Lords of His Majesty's most honorable Privy Council. 
Whereas there was this day read at the board 
the humble petition of W B — & Co.. of 
Liverpool• 
It ms ordered in Council that a license be 
granted to the said petitioners, permitting them to 
wxport on board the American ship N of about 200 
tons burden. J.C ., Master, from Liverpool direct to 
any port of the United States of America, a cargo consist-
ing of such goods as are permitted by law to be exported 
(being either British or American property) and protecting 
the said vessel, and goods as aforesaid laden therein, 
from capture or molestation by any ship of war or privateer 
bearing His Majesty's commission, on account of any 
hostilities that may exist during the time of the s&id 
voyage and during the time of her return to the pert of 
Liverpool with the said cargo |n case the said vessel 
shall not be permitted to land the same, or any part 
thereof, in any port of the United Statesj the Master 
to be permitted to receive his freight and depart with 
his crew and vessel in ballast to any port not blockaded: 
Provided, the vessel taking the benefit of said license 
shall Blear out from the port of shipment in the United 
Kingdom before the 15th of August next and that the time 
of clearance from the poot of lading shall be endorsed on 
the said license. Such license to remain in force for 
one v&yage onlju. And the Right Honorable Viscount Sidmouthm 
one of his Majesty's principal Secretaires of State, is 
hereby specially authorized to grant such license in case 
His Lordship shall see no objection there-to, annexing 
to such license the duplicate of this Order herewith 
sent for that purpose. 
(Signed). Che twynd. 
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attached the Order in Council as authority for issuance. 
Each license was good for one voyage. 
Some of the specific purposes for which 
licenses were issued are given thru the recommendation 
of the Lords of the Privy Council concerning the fees to 
he collected in the Privy Council office. The collection 
of these fees, as they related to the license practice 
and trade navigation, were as follows? first, for the 
registration of an Order in Council directing the Secretary 
of State to prepare a license permitting navigation and 
trade a fee of three pounds and 15 shillings was to be 
collected for each cargo included in the Order? second, 
for the registration of an Order in Council admitting 
to entry goods not legally imported or for relanding 
cargoes a fee of three pounds and 12 shillings was to be 
collected - in those cases requriing a duplicate a fee 
of one pound and one shilling? third, for the registration 
of an Order in Council discharging a feessel from a 
quarantine or from an embargo or for allowing the exportation 
of grain and provisions when the same was prohibited by 
Order in Council a fee of three pounds, 12 shillings and 
one pence was to be collected? fourth, for the registra-
tion of an Order in Council ellowing the exportation or 
carrying coastwise of gunpowder, saltpetre or other 
military and naval stores when the same was generally 
prohibited a fee of one pound, 12 shillings and 6 pence*-
was to be collected.1 These regulations indicate, in addition 
Reference for page 62. 
73. Commons Journals. Vol* LXIII., p. 837-839. 
65 
to a part of the fee resulting from the issuance of a 
license, evidence that is of more importance, namely, 
the nature of the operations which Great Britain stood 
ready to permit in her commercial relations. It shows clearly 
that the granting of a license was considered a relaxation 
in the rigors of a prohibition which had been imposed 
by Orders in Council. 
Prior to April 6th> 1808 the fees collected 
in the Privy Council office were divided among the clerks 
of the office. Subsequent to that date they were paid to 
Messrs. Drummond and Company to the joint account of the 
clerks in the Council office. At the end of eacft quarter 
the accounts were audited by the Lords and the clerks 
then given the amount of the quarter's salary. The salaries 
of others connected with the office and of any incidental 
expenses that might accrue were also paid with these 
fees. The surplus for every quarter was paid to MessrsM 
Drummond and Company to the account of the consolidated 
fund.^1 
The amount of all fees received at the 
Secretary's office for the Home department wa6 pSkAced to 
the general fee account of that office, divided equally 
with the forign and colonial departments and apjjblied 
towards the discharge of the expenses of the establishmants 
of the three offices? ' 
The revenue aspect of the license practice 
was of no small proportion. The payment of duties upon the 
lading of a cargo for exportation completed the requirements 
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for obtaining a license. The duties were regulated by the 
schedules provided in 48 Geo. Ill c. 26. The amount of 
revenue resulting from the payment of these duties was, 
to January 5th, 1809, £32256$ to February, 1812, £^987^176. 
We have now completed a representation of the organization 
and method in the license practice. How that practice 
operated is a more detailed study for another time. 
Our ta3k of describing the commercial 
system of Great Britain as it was established by the 
Orders in Council in 1807-1808 now comes to a close• We 
have endeavored to show that the real object of the OrderB 
was not so much retaliation upon France as it was the 
commerce and the carrying trade of the United States. 
As evidence supporting this, we have pointdd out the 
growth of the spirit of jealousy in Great Britain in her 
attitude towards American relations from 1805-1807. With 
the ascendency of that spirit James Stejihen was actively 
identified. He was also closely associated with the issuance 
of the Orders in Council. His pamphlet,11 War in Disguise? 
in 1805, and his speech before Parliament in March 1809 
represent his views both before and after the Orders 
in Council System was instituted. These opinions are 
the same in both cases. mThey were 5 that the commercial 
interests of Great Britain must be protected, that 
America was the source of greatest danger to the continued 
superiority of Great Britain on the ocean and that the 
Orders in Council System was the best means of affording 
an effectual checft to that rival. In July^his opinion 
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Schedule "A n. 
Duties payable on the exportation of certain foreign godds 
not imported by the East India Company and which upon im-
portation are allowed to be warehoused without payment fif 
duties thereon. 
Fesuit's bark - - - - - - - - the pound, 6 shillings. 
Cochineal - - - n w 7 11 
Cocoa nuts - - - - - - - - - - - M cwt. LI. 
Coffee 11 w w ffis. 
Hemp - - rough or undressed - w^ 11 15 s. 
Hides, viz: buffalo, bull, cow or* ox, the hide 5s. 
Indigo - - - - - - - - - - - -the pundd 2s. 
Prize goods, viz: goods taken and condemned as prize, not 
being of the vgrowth, produce or manufacture 
of any country or place within the charter 
limits of the East India Co., and not 
being particularly enumerated or charged with 
duty in this table, for every #100 value 
thereof - - - - - - - - - -L20. 
Prohibited goods - for every L100 value thereof - -L20. 
Sugar, brown, - - - - - the ffffiffig cwt - - 10s. 
Sugar, white, - - - - - - the cwt. 17s. 
Yarn, Viz; cotton yarn - - the pound 2s. 
Schedules "B11 & "C" were similar in amount 
and inposed the same duty on prize goods as did "A11. 
77. Commons Journals, Vol. LXIV. Appendix, P. 641. 
« « « LXVII. 11 P. 761. 
w " 11 LXIII. 11 P. 600. 
Levi, History Of British dommerce, p. 109. 
Huraber of commercial licenses granted: 1803, 836: 
1804, 1141: 1805, 791: 1806, 1620: 1807, 2606: 1808, 
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found expression thru a report of a commission which had 
been appointed to investigate the commercial state of the 
West Indies. Lord Castlereagh, of the ministry, was 
intimately associated with this commission and it was thru 
his pen that the subject of commercial regulations was 
actively opened for Cabinet discussion. Neutral commerce 
and not retaliation was the substance of the correspondnnce 
which resulted. In fact, at no time during the rise of Ihihe 
Orders in Council System does the aim of retaliation upon 
France appear to take precedence to the desire to get at 
neutral commerce. The System, when completed in the early 
months of 1808, reflected the attitude faf the times which 
preceded its adoption. In addition to these circumstances, 
there remains, yet to be kept in mind, the license practice. 
Since that meant, in practically every case where it was 
employed, a relaxation of the declarations of hostility 
which had been put forth in the Orders, the extent to 
which it was permitted and encouraged again placed 
commercial considerations in the foreground. 
There is one other jknt which we have 
tried to make clear. The Orders do not represent the ex-
pression of a continuous jjbolicy on the part of successive 
ministries. Because of this fact there exists |n the 
System certain elements of uncertainty and experimentation. 
These are introduced by the fact that a Whig ministry 
was identified with thd issuance of the Order of January 
7th, 1807 whereas a Tory ministry issued those of 
66. 
November 11th, 1807. This party division marked the lines 
of opposition from the first. The Tories criticized the 
Hhig Order as being an inadequate measure and remedy for 
the situation. The Whigs, after they had been removed 
from the government and placed in the position of the 
minority, formed the center of opposition against Tory 
policy. They opposed all the steps in the progress of the 
Tory System from its first appearance before Parliament 
in January 1808. Their aggressive koppesition and the 
uncertainty and the unwillingness of the ministry to give 
and adequate or satisfactory explanation of the policy 
they had adopted represents the lack of coherence and of 
unity in the System. 
We may say, then, that the real object of 
the Orders in Council was to get at American commerce and 
to sustain British maritime superiority, that their policy 
and method, because of the alignment of political parties 
in the adoption and support of the measures, was more or 
less of an experiment and that thay do not represent 
adherence to a clearly defined and consistent aggressive 
policy. 
The Orders in Council. 
(Prom a Handbill printed in London.) 
Proposed inscription for the lid of a chest in the archives 
of the Privy Council. 
Beneath, are deposited 
all that remains of the once celebrated 
OrdeBS in Council. 
Circumscribed by this narrow boundary 
and reduced to a few shreds of 
worthless parchment, 
those haughty and innovating decrees 
which, in their life time, convulsed empires 
wnd tore the scanty morsel 
from the grasp of starving millions, 
now repose in harmless obscurity. 
Thru the baser passions of the human heart 
the moral genealogist 
may perhaps trace their origin to a remoter distance, 
but their immediate progenitors, were 
malignity and infatuation. 
Postered by unremitted parental care 
and the laborious exertions of their nearest relatives 
sophistry and falsehood 
they rapidly obtained 
a formidable and disgraceful maturity. 
During a disastrous period 
of six years 
they exercised an uncontrolled oppression 
over the resources and industry of the poorj 
Polluted the commercial character of Great Britain 
with the most loathsome villainies; 
cherished the infant manufactures of our rivals; 
and insulted the public rights of mankind 
by a long series of lifcteful and aggressive depreda-
tions . 
Their career was at length arrested 
by the awakened energies of their v|ct$ms: 
and after a resistance 
which only proved the gendiifcne cowardice of tyranny 
when opposed to the united efforts of 
rectitude and patriotism -
overwhelmed by the contempt of the wise 
and the execrations of the good 
they expired June 16th. 1812. 
On the same day 
their only legitimate descendant 
the license system 
shared the fate of its guilty parent: 
and their death is thus recorded 
by an indignant public 
as an enwit 
fraught with admonition to future legislators, 
and strongly illustrative 
of the consolatory and important truth, 
that it is essential to the very nature of evil 
to issue in its own destruction. 
Niles Register, Vol. IV. p. 46 
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